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Abstract 
The electronic health record (eHR) system has recently been considered one of the biggest advancements in 
healthcare services. A personally controlled electronic health record (PCEHR) system is proposed by the 
Australian government to make the health system more agile, secure, and sustainable. Although the PCEHR 
system claims the electronic health records can be controlled by the patients, healthcare professionals and 
database/system operators may assist in disclosing the patients’ eHRs for retaliation or other ill purposes. As the 
conventional methods for preserving the privacy of eHRs solely trust the system operators, these data are 
vulnerable to be exploited by the authorised personnel in an immoral/unethical way. Furthermore, issues such as 
the sheer number of eHRs, their sensitive nature, flexible access, and efficient user revocation have remained the 
most important challenges towards fine-grained, cryptographically enforced data access control. In this paper we 
propose a patient centric cloud-based PCEHR framework, which employs a homomorphic encryption technique 
in storing the eHRs. The proposed system ensures the control of both access and privacy of eHRs stored in the 
cloud database. 
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INTRODUCTION 
eHealth has recently been considered a precipitately changing segment of the healthcare industry. eHealth is 
defined in many ways such as the transfer of health resources and healthcare by electronic means. According to 
The World Health Organisation (WHO), eHealth is defined as the combined use of electronic communication 
and information technology in the health sector (Eysenbach, 2001). The recently proposed Australian 
government’s personally controlled electronic health record (PCEHR) system is one of the best examples of 
eHealth system implementation (National E-Health Transition Authority Australia, 2011). 
The electronic healthcare record (eHR) is the principle aspect of an eHealth system such as PCEHR. eHR is the 
digitally stored healthcare information about an individual's lifetime with the purpose of supporting continuity of 
care, education and research, and ensuring confidentiality at all times (Gajanayake, Iannella, & Sahama, 2012). 
eHRs aid efficient communication of medical data and thus ease organisational disbursements with the help of 
cloud computing (Muhammad, Zwicker, & Wickramasinghe, 2013, Wu, Ahn, & Hu, 2012). 
However, privacy in particular, has always been one of the main concerns in eHealth systems (Petkovic & 
Ibraimi, 2011, Xanthidis & Aleisa, 2012). According to Richard Rognehaugh, privacy is the right of individuals 
to keep information about themselves from being disclosed to others (Rognehaugh, 1999). The information that 
is shared as a result of a clinical relationship is considered confidential and must be protected (Rinehart-
Thompson & Harman, 2006).  
A patient’s health information may contain sensitive information such as sexual health, mental health, addictions 
to drug or alcohol, abortions, etc. This makes such a patient demand strong privacy for their eHR system. It is 
important to note that in the digital environment, disclosed private information cannot be recovered and will last 
indefintely. Not giving patients control over their private data might result in patients withholding or trying to 
delete sensitive medical information from their eHRs in order to preserve their privacy (Klitzman, 2006). Yet 
again, privacy risks can also arise from health care professionals. Due to the complexity of eHR systems, 
healthcare professionals can make innocent mistakes to cause disclosure of a patient’s  information.  
On the other hand, a system operator may intentionally leak out patients’ information for revenge, spite, profit, 
or other ill purposes. Risks from inadvertent or intentional release of infectious, mental health, chronic disease 
diagnoses, and genetic information are all well recognized both online and in mass media.  
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In the conventional privacy preserving techniques, system operators are assumed to be trusted. But in some 
cases, they may not be reliable. Therefore, we need to construct such a system to eliminate the above 
assumption.  
In addition, an eHR system needs to be able to deal effectively with a very high volume of patients’ sensitive 
data along with ensuring user authentication, role based access control, and patients’ authorisation. Thus, a 
multi-level security system is required to protect the privacy of eHRs.  
To address all the above mentioned issues, in this paper, we propose a framework to access patients’ eHRs. This 
patient centric framework employs a homomorphic encryption technique in storing and updating the eHRs. The 
encryption system allows computation on cipher text, thus eliminates the dependency on trusted third parties or 
system operators. In this framework, the encrypted eHRs residing in the cloud server are accessed by different 
uses through multi-level security procedures.  
RELATED WORK 
Researchers have proposed several solutions to solve the security and privacy problems related to eHRs. Existing 
research work associated with privacy preserving techniques of patient eHRs can be categorized as i) Privacy by 
access control, and ii) Privacy by cryptographic approaches 
Privacy by Access Control 
The key objective of access control mechanisms is to permit the authorised users to manipulate data and thus 
maintain  the privacy of data (Barua, Liang, Lu, & Shen, 2011). However, the progresses are not satisfactory 
enough to fullfil the privacy requirements for eHRs (Santos-Pereira, Augusto, & Cruz-Correia, 2013). 
Different access control mechanisms can be found in the literature (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2007; Chen et al., 2012). 
Discretionary access control (DAC), mandatory access control (MAC), role based access control (RBAC), and 
purpose-based access control (PBAC) are the basic models of the access control principles. 
DAC restricts access to objects based on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. However,  
in DAC granting read access is transitive  and the policies are helpless for Trojan Horse Attack (Ferraiolo, Kuhn, 
& Chandramouli, 2003, Hu, Ferraiolo, & Kuhn, 2006).  
MAC policy can prevent the Trojan Horse that occurrs in DAC. MAC is based on access control policy 
decisions, made by a central authority (Ferraiolo et al., 2003, Sandhu & Samarati 1994). In MAC, the individual 
owner of an object has no right to control the access. Thus, MAC policy fails to preserve the privacy requirement 
for eHRs of the patients (Motta & Furuie, 2003). 
RBAC (Park & Sandhu, 2002) models use consents and rights based on the assigned roles in groups/institutions 
to limit access. However, RBAC cannot integrate other access parametes or related data that are significant in 
allowing access to the user (Evered & Bögeholz, 2004). 
PBAC is based on the notion of associating data objects with aims (Byun, Bertino & Li, 2005). PBAC has 
proven the greater privacy preservation by allocating objects with purposes (Naikuo, Howard & Ning 2007; Li, 
Yu, Ren & Lou 2010).  
However,  purpose administration creates a great deal of difficulty at the access control level. In Gajanayake et 
al. (2012), the authors combine three existing access control models and present a novel access control model for 
eHRs which satisfies the requirements of eHRs but the processes are more complex to implement. 
Privacy by Cryptographic Approach 
The cryptographic approach is considered one of the safest ways to preserve the security and the privacy of 
information in distributed settings. To transmit the data safely in cloud computing, cryptographic solutions are 
suitable enough by practicing the public key structure (Ding & Klein, 2010). Encrypting the private information 
before sending it to the cloud is an inherent need to a cloud user. But not all settings may allow that to happen. 
As mentioned in the previous section, in many systems the user has to trust the operator and gives the authority 
to their data by default. Many cryptographic solutions have now eliminated this requirement and ensure the full 
authority of the data is in the hand of its owner. 
To deal with the potential risks of such privacy exposure, several eHealth systems (Benaloh Chase, Horvitz &  
Lauter, 2009; Jin Ahn, Hu, Covington & Zhang, 2009; Li et al., 2010) let patients encrypt their health record 
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before storing it in the cloud. Van der Haak et al. (2003) use digital signatures and public-key authentication (for 
access control) to satisfy legal requirements for cross-institutional exchange of electronic patient records. 
Ateniese, Curtmola, de Medeiros & Davis (2002) use the concept of pseudonyms to preserve patient anonymity. 
Layouni, Verslype, Sandikkaya, De Decker & Vangheluwe (2009) consider communication between health 
monitoring equipment at a patient's home and the health-care centre.  
All these proposed solutions might preserve some of the privacy issues of a patient. They may require the 
encrypted data to be downloaded from the cloud to the patients’ local machine when a modification or a 
computation might be necessary. This unreasonable requirement would ruin the sole purpose of using the cloud 
system. Therefore, these proposed solutions are impractical in PCEHR settings. 
Hence, an encryption-based practical solution for the PCEHR system is extremely important to ensure the full 
authority of the private data to its owner.  
THE PROPOSED MODEL 
In this section we describe the proposed cloud-based PCEHR model using homomorphic encryption, which is 
briefly discussed below. 
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) 
Homomorphic encryption is a special form of encryption where one can perform a specific algebraic operation 
on the plain-text by applying the same or different operation on the cipher-text. If x and y are two numbers and E 
and D denote encryption and decryption function respectively, then homomorphic encryption holds the 
following condition for an algebraic operation, such as ‘+’: 
D[E(x)+E(y)] = D[E(x+y)] 
Most homomorphic encryption system such as RSA, ElGamal, Benaloh, Paillier etc. are capable of performing 
only one operation. But the fully homomorphic encryption system can be used for many operations (such as 
addition, multiplication, division etc.) at the same time. In the area of cryptography, the fully homomorphic 
encryption (FHE) system proposed by Dijk, Gentry, Halevi & Vaikuntanathan (2010) is considered as a 
breakthrough work which can be used to solve many cryptographic problems. Key generation, encryption and 
decryption functions of this FHE are as follows: 
KeyGen ( ) : Choose a random n-bit odd integer p as the private key. Using the private key, generate the public 
key as            where    and    are chosen randomly, for          . Rearrange     such that,    is 
the largest. 
Encrypt (           : Choose a random subset            and a random integer      is encrypted to the 
cipher-text          ∑           
 
   
. Let us denote this operation as         
Decrypt      : The message   is recovered simply by performing                  Let us denote this 
operation as         
Further detail of this FHE can be found in Naehrig, Lauter, & Vaikuntanathan (2011). 
In this proposed PCEHR framework, we will use this FHE technique to enable the system to perform 
computation on encrypted data. The patient will be the owner of the secret key therefore none can decrypt his/her 
health record; whereas, the user might be able to perform some edit or write operations on the record without 
knowing the content of the record itself. Figure 1 demonstrates how this FHE can be used in such a secure 
computation. 
 
 
Figure 1. A user can update a patients’ record in the secured server without knowing the content of the record 
Sk, 
Pk1, Pk2...Pkτ
Patient
User
Record R is updated (R={R||R’}) 
securely in the system
ESk(R) EPki (R’)
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Architecture of the Proposed Model 
A simplified architecture of the proposed model is shown in Figure 2. The model consists of several entities. 
These entities are briefly described below: 
a. User of Patients’ eHR: In the proposed model, the user refers to any person/organization that needs to access 
the patients’ eHRs. Thus, the term ‘user’ includes a general practitioner (GP), specialist, pharmacist, nurse, 
healthcare provider, provider/health insurance company, diagnostic laboratory, hospital, research personnel, 
family member or relative of the patient. The purpose of the user may differ according to their role, such that a 
GP might need to access the previous records for making a prescription, whereas a diagnostic lab may need to 
store a report against a patient only. 
 
`  
Figure 2. Simplified architecture of the proposed model 
 
b. Authentication Server: The authentication server ensures legitimate access in to the network of the model. The 
authentication process is usually based on passwords. However, different types of information such as biometric 
information, rather than text based information, can also be used in the authertication process. Usually every user 
needs to be registered in the system by associated authority. Other algorithms such as the challenge response 
protocol, Kerberos, and public key encryption, can be used by the authentication server.  
c. Access Control List (ACL) Server: The main purpose of this server is to verify when users want to access a 
specific sub-profile of eHRs of the patients. After a user is authenticated in the system, the access control list 
server applies access control policies/rules correlated  with the authenticated users. Access policies can be  
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defined as relationships between subjects, objects and actions. For example, a pathology lab technician usually 
does not need to access a patient’s mental health eHRs, or an insuarance company personnel does not need to 
modify patient’s disease history. The ACL list also specifies how a user can access an object class of a patients’ 
eHRs, in other words, the actions that the user can perform on a sub-profile, e.g. read, write, etc. 
d. Authorisation Server: After passing through the authentication and ACL servers, users need to be authorised 
by a patient through an authorisation server to access specific eHRs of the patient. The ACL server confirms the 
eHR class (known as sub-profile) accessibility, while authorisation confirms a particular object of that eHR 
class. If a patient provides permission to a user, the authorisation server will issue a token using the encrypted 
data which can be retrieved from the database server. The encrypted data can be decrypted by the patient’s 
private key only.  
Figure 3 shows how the ACL and the authorisation servers allow users to access patients’ sub-profiles and eHRs. 
The figure shows four patients P1, P2, P3 and P4. Each patient owns a profile. A patient’s profile is divided into 
several sub-profiles, such as mental health, sexual health, physical health, personal information etc. The privacy 
policy dictates which professionals (known as user in the proposed model) are permitted to acces which sub-
profiles of the patients. For example, Figure 3 shows that the trainer is authorised via the ACL server to deal 
with patients’ personal information and physical health. However, the trainer does not have any priviledge to 
acces patients’ sexual health or mental health. After accessing through the ACL server, the user waits for a 
patient’s exclusive permission to access the eHR of the patient. Figure 3 also shows that the phychiatrist receives 
permissions to access P1’s mental health, the trainer receives permission to access P2’s physical health. 
Although verified by the ACL server to access physical health sub-profiles of patients, the trainer can not access 
P1’s physical Health. 
 
 
Figure 3. An overview of the function of the authorisation server 
e. Patient: The patient may be defined as the owner of his/her medical data and therefore holds full rights on the 
access control of his/her data. In our proposed model, only the patient has the key to decrypt the data and hence 
without the patient’s consent no-one can access the eHRs. This means that the patient must be able to access the 
information about all types of data transfer, its purpose and its user. In addition, the patient must receive all the 
notifications whenever someone uses or access the records. 
f. Cloud Storage: Scalability would be one of the challenges of eHR system, because the system needs to handle 
millions of patients’ electronic health records. For example, body are networks (BANs) are recently been 
proposed to monitor patients’ health. BANs sense, generate, and send monitoring data to the healthcare system.  
Indeed, the sampling is performed at high frequency, which increases the amount of collected data. In addition, 
the frequency of sampling is often increased if the condition of patients being monitored gets worse. The 
Mental 
Health
Personal 
Information
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Health
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amount, size, and heterogeneity of data drive a need for an increasing storage and processing capacities. Besides 
scalability issues, medical data could be life saving and must be accessible at any time and from everywhere. 
Existing solutions rely on a centralized paradigm to store and process sensed data thus cannot tackle the 
aforementioned challenges. Thus, we need new innovative solutions to meet the great challenges of handling the 
exponential growth in data. We leverage cloud computing technology to dynamically scale storage resources via 
on demand provisioning. Cloud service providers can be any type of internet provider or application that lives in 
the cloud and is accessed online. As encrypted data is used in our model, the providers do not know the original 
records.  
g. Encrypted Database Server: A database server can be referred to as the back-up system of a database usage 
client/server structure. A database server accomplishes several tasks such as data analysis, storage, data 
handling, archiving, and other non-user specific tasks. In the cloud environment, eHRs are always vulnerable to 
attacks. Encryption of the database server helps us prevent unauthorised access to information database. 
Applying the homomorphic encryption technique, we can ensure the privacy of the eHRs of the patient. 
h. System Operators: According to the PCEHR system, the system operator is the entity that is responsible for 
generating and operating the PCEHR system. The system operator must respect the instructions and 
recommendations (if any) during their duties given by the PCEHR Jurisdictional Advisory Committee and the 
PCEHR Independent Advisory Council (2013). 
In general, system operators are either persons or machines who oversee the operation of a large computer 
network. So, system operators enable access to the database as it is assumed that they are always trusted 
authority. In our proposed model, we use cryptographic solutions to encrypt the central database. This is done by 
the encryption mechanism which can support addition and multiplication of the encrypted data. One instance of 
data access method is depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Accessing patient’s eHR by a user (doctor) 
Many encryption techniques support one of these operations, either addition or multiplication like the encryption 
schemes in Rivest, Shamir & Adleman, 1978; El Gamal, 1985; Goldwasser & Micali, 1984; Paillier, 1999. A 
cryptosystem which supports both addition and multiplication (homomorphic) can be successful for data 
security, and supports the creation of programs that accept encrypted input and generate encrypted output. As a 
result, system operators cannot know the original records of the patient.  
ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED MODEL 
Below we discuss different possibilities of attacks against patients’ eHRs and demonstrate how these attacks 
would be handled by the proposed model. 
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Case I: An Intruder wants to access eHRs 
The Intruder could be controlled by the authentication server. The Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service 
(RADIUS) protocol can be used in the authentication server. In this client/server based protocol, the client passes 
user information to designated RADIUS servers and acts on the response that is returned. RADIUS servers 
receive user connection requests, authenticate the user, and then return the configuration information necessary 
for the client to deliver service to the user.  
The RADIUS server supports a variety of methods to authenticate a user. When it is provided with the username 
and original password given by the user, it can support PPP, PAP or CHAP, UNIX login, and other 
authentication mechanisms. Typically, a user login consists of a query (Access-Request) from the NAS to the 
RADIUS server and a corresponding response (Access-Accept or Access-Reject) from the server. When the 
RADIUS server receives the Access-Request from the NAS, it searches a database for the username listed. If the 
username does not exist in the database, either a default profile is loaded or the RADIUS server immediately 
sends an Access-Reject message. This Access-Reject message can be accompanied by a text message indicating 
the reason for the refusal. 
Case II: X tries to masquerade as Y  
The ACL server maintains a list of permissions attached to each object class (for example, sexual health 
information, neonatal information, drug related information etc.) of a patients’ eHRs. An ACL specifies which 
users or system processes are granted access to object classes, as well as what operations are allowed on given 
object classes. Each entry in a typical ACL specifies a subject and an operation. For instance, if a file has an 
ACL that contains (Alice, read), this would give Alice permission to read a particular type of eHR. When a 
subject X requests an operation on a eHR type in the proposed model, the operating system checks the ACL for 
an applicable entry to decide whether the requested operation is legitimate. A key issue in the definition of any 
ACL-based security model is determining how access control lists are edited, namely which users and processes 
are granted ACL modification access. If the subject X is not entitled to access the object class, the system will 
generate an alert and inform appropriate level of personnel. 
Case III: The subject X manages to pass through the ACL server and tries to access information of a 
specific patient’s eHR 
Passing through the authentication and ACL server, the subject X needs authorisation from the patient to acces 
his/her eHRs. The authorisation server will generate a key to retrieve a patient’s a particular type of eHR. Thus, 
if healthcare personnel try to access an eHR, for which she/he is not authorised, the authorisation server will not 
allow the illegitimate access/retreival of the patients’ eHRs.  
Case IV: System operators try to abuse patients’ eHRs 
This is a crucial part in the proposed model. Homomorphic encryption would be used in the database server of 
the proposed mode. All eHRs of patients are encrypted in the database server using homomorphic encryption. 
This  encryption technique allows the patients to update their eHRs without letting the system operator know 
about the content of the modification. Even the system operators will not be able to identify in which sub-profile 
the modification occurred. 
Case V: One patient tries to access/permit other patients’ eHRs  
Each patient, whenever they enter the system, is authenticated by the authentication server. After 
successfulauthentication, if the patient wants to hack another patient’s eHRs, he/she will not be successful 
because only the corresponding patient has the private key to decrypt the eHRs. 
Case VI: Man in the Middle Attack 
In out proposed framework, man in the middle attack is impossible. Let us consider the instances when te e-HR 
of a patient is updated or used: 
(i) Update in the cloud server: When any e-HR user e.g. lab, wants to update the profile of the patient then the 
authentication and access right is ensured by authentication server, ACL server and the patient’s consent. 
These server would maintain a seesion freshness mechanism to protect any man in the middle attack. 
(ii) Display and update at the doctor’s end: When a doctor or specialist will need to access any e-HR of a 
patient, we assume, the patient will be present in the session. The doctor will download the encrypted 
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relevant part of the record from the server to his local machine. Then he only can decrypt locally with the 
help of the key provided by the patient. Again at the end of the session if the doctor needs to update the e-
HR, he will encrypt the relevant part of the profile on his machine locally with the key provided by the 
parient and upload to the cloud server. Therefore, man in the middle attack cannot have access to the e-HR 
since it is encrypted. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we present a PCEHR model to protect the privacy of patients’ eHRs using a cryptographic 
technique. Many studies have been performed to ensure the privacy of the system, where the system operators 
are able to access patient’s eHRs. In our proposed model, system operators cannot learn about a patients’ eHRs. 
Highest priority is given to the patients to control their eHRs to ensure the highest level of privacy.  
 
According to the proposed model, only the patient has the key to decrypt the data. As a result, when a patient is 
disabled or intellilectually impaired or in the case of emergency, it is infeasible for any medical service to retrive 
the eHRs. Our future work will include the access control policy using which patient’s eHR can be accessed 
during an emergency while still preserving their privacy. We also want to implement the proposed model which 
can be compared with other existing solutions in terms of efficiency and privacy. 
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